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Since the early 1970s, the probability of systemic crises appears to have been rising. The 
costs of systemic crises have risen in parallel. The incidence and scale of systemic crises 
have risen to levels never previously seen in financial history [Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)]. 
It has meant that reducing risks to the financial system as a whole – systemic risks – has 
emerged as a top public policy priority. 
The ongoing financial crisis is the most visible manifestation of this trend. Five years on 
from its inception, the level of real output in each of the major industrialised economies 
remains significantly below its pre-crisis path (Chart 1). In cumulative terms, crisis-induced 
output losses have so far reached almost 60 %, over 40 % and over 30 % of annual pre-
crisis GDP in the UK, Euro-area and US respectively.1
With the benefit of hindsight, the pre-crisis policy framework was ill-equipped to forestall 
the build-up in systemic risk which generated these huge costs. Monetary policy 
internationally was aimed at balancing nominal demand in line with the supply capacity of 
the economy. And microprudential regulation meanwhile focused on the health and 
conduct of individual financial institutions. This approach appeared to work well for some 
time – we entered a “Great Moderation”.2 Certainly, demand and inflation were stable and 
there were few failures of financial institutions.
But at the same time, something dramatic was happening within the financial sector. Global 
banks’ balance sheets doubled between 1990 and 2007. In some countries, such as the UK 
and Spain, the ballooning of balance sheets was more dramatic still. As financial exuberance 
took hold, credit became too cheaply priced. Latent financial vulnerabilities began to emerge. 
To some extent, these emerging fault-lines reflected fundamental weaknesses in the 
microprudential regime. In particular, regulatory limits on banks’ leverage ratios were set 
1  Introduction
1  It could plausibly be argued that these output costs are an overstatement of the damage caused by the financial 
crisis as the pre-crisis level may have been unsustainable.
2  See Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Bernanke (2004).
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at levels which, with hindsight, were far too low.3 But there are also limits to what prudential 
regulation could reasonably achieve as long as it was static and calibrated 
to institution-specific balance sheets. With this focus, the build-up of leverage and 
3  See Wellink (2011) for a summary of weaknesses in the pre-crisis microprudential regime. Consistent with 
regulatory definitions, this paper defines leverage ratios by dividing the relevant measures of capital by assets (e.g. 
a leverage ratio of 4%) rather than the reverse (e.g. a leverage ratio of 25 times). But the discussion uses the 
standard English language interpretation of associating rising levels of leverage with greater indebtedness – under 
the definition used here, this is equivalent to a falling leverage ratio.
Governance Structure Mandate Powers
United Kingdom 
Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC)
– Chair:  Governor of the Bank
   of England
– 10 voting members (5 from BoE,
   including head of prudential regulator;
   head of conduct regulator; 4 external
   members), one non-voting HM
   Treasury representative 
– Meets quarterly
– Protect and enhance the resilience 
   of the UK ?nancial system
– Subject to this, support 
   the government’s economic objectives
   including for growth and employment
– Cannot take actions that would
   be detrimental to medium-to-long
   term growth   
– Direction powers over Countercyclical Capital
   Buffers and Sectoral Capital Requirements
– Comply-or-explain Recommendation powers
   over prudential and conduct regulators
– Recommendations (not comply-or-explain)
   to other bodies (eg on regulatory perimeter)
– Measures cannot be directed at individual
   institutions
United States
Financial Stability 
Oversight Council 
(FSOC)
– Chair:  US Secretary of the Treasury
– 10 voting and 5 non-voting members
   from Federal Reserve and supervisory
   agencies
– Meets at least quarterly
– Identify and respond to emerging 
   threats to ?nancial stability
– Promote market discipline, eliminate
   bailout expectations
– Recommendations to the supervisory
   authorities on heightened prudential standards
– Designation of systemically important non-bank
   ?nancial institutions and ?nancial market utilities
– Reporting to Congress on regulatory gaps
European Union
European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB)
– Chair:  ECB President
– 37 voting members, including central
   bank governors, and 28 non-voting
   members from supervisory agencies
– Meets quarterly
– Prevent or mitigate systemic risks
   to the EU ?nancial system
– Contribute to smooth functioning
   of the internal market and sustainable
   ?nancial sector growth
– Systemic risk warnings and non-binding
   recommendations to European
   member states
Germany 
German Financial 
Stability Commission
(Ausschuss für 
Finanzstabilität)
– Chair:  The Federal Minister of Finance
   (or deputy)
– Three representatives from the Ministry
   of Finance, three from the Deutsche
   Bundesbank; and three from
   the BaFin. Non-voting role for
   the chairman of the FMSA 
– Meets quarterly
Tasks of the Commission include:
– Consideration of decisive issues
   for ?nancial stability
– Strengthening cooperation in a crisis
   between institutions represented on
   the Commission
– Warnings and recommendations to
   the German government, the BaFin,
   or any other public sector institution
   within Germany.  Recipients obliged
   to respond within an appropriate timeframe.
– Legal right to request data (forthcoming)
   both from reporting entities and other
   public authorities
France
Financial Stability 
Council (Conseil de 
stabilité ?nancière CSF)
– Chair:  Finance Minister
– 9 members (Banque de France
   Governor, the Secretary General
   and deputy of the prudential supervisor
   (ACP), the head of the markets
   regulator, the head of the accounting
   standards authority and three external
   independent members) 
– Maintain the stability of the ?nancial
   system and guaranteeing that the
   ?nancial sector makes a sustainable
   contribution to economic growth
– Ensure co-operation and exchange
   of information among its members
– Recommendations to institutions
   represented on the CSF (which
   may be published) to prevent threats
   to ?nancial stability. Recipients must inform
   the CSF of the actions taken in response
– At the proposal of the Governor of the BdF,
   de?ning capital requirements on exposures
   in France and outside the EEA
– At the proposal of the Governor of the BdF,
   stipulating criteria or conditions for loans
   issued by banks
Switzerland – The Swiss National Bank has the right
   to submit proposals to the Federal
   Council, following consultation with
   the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory
   Authority (FINMA)  
– Decision-making power rests with
   the Federal Council
– Increase the resilience of the banking
   sector and the overall economy against
   risks posed by excessive credit growth
– Counter excessive credit growth
   and price rises 
– Sector-speci?c countercyclical capital
   buffer targeting residential mortgage lending
Sweden
Council for cooperation 
on macroprudential 
policy
– Chair: Governor of the Riksbank
– 6 members (a Deputy Governor of the
   Riksbank and its Head of Financial
   Stability, the Director General,
   Chief Economist and Chief Legal
   Council of Finansinspektionen,
   the microprudential supervisor) 
– Meets at least twice a year
SOURCES: Bank of England, Financial Stability Oversight Council, European Systemic Risk Board, Bundesbank, Banque de France, Swiss National Bank and 
Riksbank.
– Discuss both authorities’ assessments
   of systemic risks, appropriate prevention
   measures and issues relating to
   development of macroprudential policy
   in general
Not de?ned
A SELECTION OF SYSTEMIC RISK FRAMEWORKS AROUND THE WORLD TABLE 1
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maturity mismatch across the financial system, and growing interconnectedness within it, 
was under-emphasised. 
In response, a broad consensus has emerged internationally over the past few years on the 
need to introduce macroprudential regulation.4 In essence, this new approach seeks to ensure 
that regulatory rules are attuned to risks arising across the financial system as a whole. Put 
differently, it aims to plug the gap between macroeconomic policy on the one hand and micro-
prudential regulation on the other – a gap through which the largest crisis in a generation fell. 
New macroprudential regimes are being put in place around the globe. For example, in the 
United Kingdom, the Financial Services Act (2012) creates a Financial Policy Committee (FPC) 
at the Bank of England, with broad powers to make “comply-or-explain” recommendations 
and control over a set of specific macroprudential tools. In the US, the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) and in the Euro-area the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
have been set up with broadly similar objectives. Macroprudential frameworks are being 
established in a number of other countries too, including in Switzerland, France and Germany 
to name but a few. Table 1 summarises a selection of them.5 
In this paper, we provide an overview of the progress made in making macroprudential 
regimes operational. Section 2 sets out an analysis of the sources of systemic risk. Section 3 
uses this as the basis for a taxonomy of potential macroprudential policy instruments. 
Section 4 provides a case study of how one such instrument – the countercyclical capital 
buffer – might be made operational. The material in this section draws heavily on the analysis 
presented in Bank of England (2013). Section 5 concludes with a discussion of open issues, 
of which there are many.
In designing a public policy framework for tackling systemic risk, a natural first step is to 
identify potential sources of such risk. In this respect, economists have often found it 
analytically convenient to distinguish two manifestations:6 
—  First, time-varying or cyclical risks whose magnitude at any point in time depends on 
the amount of risk the financial system as a whole takes, relative to its available capital 
and liquidity resources; and
—  Second, cross-section or structural risks whose magnitude depends on the network 
of connections between financial institutions and the distribution of risk across 
financial market participants. 
There is a strong collective tendency for financial firms, companies and households to 
overexpose themselves to risk in the upswing of a credit cycle and to become overly risk-
averse in a downswing. This pro-cyclicality has a variety of underlying behavioural causes, 
including myopia about risk7 and herding in financial markets.8 The result is a feast-or-famine 
problem, with credit plentiful when times are good, but severely rationed when they are bad.
2  Fundamental sources 
of systemic risk
2.1  TIME-VARYING OR 
CYCLICAL RISKS
4  See inter alia Bank of England (2009, 2011), FSB-IMF-BIS (2011), De Larosière (2009), Van Rompuy (2012), G30 
(2010), HM Treasury (2011), CGFS (2010), IMF (2011), Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011).
5  Nier et al. (2011) set out some of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative institutional frameworks for 
conducting macroprudential policy.
6  This distinction draws on Borio and Crockett (2000) and is consistent with those adopted by others in the literature, 
including Bank of England (2009, 2011), CGFS (2010), Group of Thirty (2010), IMF (2011) and FSB/IMF/BIS (2011). 
7  See Guttentag and Herring (1986), Herring (1998), Haldane (2009a), Gennaioli, Schleifer and Vishny (2012).
8  On the theory of herding in financial markets, see Avery and Zemsky (1998);  Lakonishok et al. (1992) test its 
empirical relevance. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) provide an overview of the literature.
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This credit cycle is not just disruptive in its own right. Historically, it has also tended to 
propagate crises. Credit booms have sown the seeds of subsequent credit crunches for 
many centuries. The work of Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger (1989) were both attempts to 
make sense of these regular patterns in the relationship between credit growth and crises, 
drawing on detailed case studies of past financial crises.
Schularik and Taylor (2012) have recently provided some econometric support for this link 
between credit and crises. The authors compile a dataset of financial variables from 12 
developed economies over almost 140 years. They find credit growth to be the single best 
predictor of financial instability over this period. For example, according to their estimates, 
a one standard deviation change in real loan growth raises the probability of a crisis by 
between two and three percentage points, relative to an in-sample crisis frequency of just 
under 4 per cent. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) report similar findings using a dataset of 170 
countries back to the 1960s. They find that roughly two-thirds of all credit booms are 
followed either by a banking crisis or by a period of sub-par economic growth.9 
Aikman, Haldane and Nelson (2010) use the Schularik and Taylor dataset to document the 
empirical properties of credit cycles. As Chart 2 illustrates for the UK, bank credit exhibits 
a remarkably regular pattern of cyclical swings. A broadly similar pattern is evident in most 
other countries. Relative to the typical business cycle, two features of the credit cycle 
stand out. First, its average duration is over 10 years, far longer than the typical business 
cycle. This makes it harder to distinguish structural and cyclical shifts in credit: a lengthy 
cyclical credit boom may look like a permanent technological shift, as during the run-up to 
the present crisis. 
Second, credit cycles are also distinct from business cycles in their amplitude. The 
amplitude of credit cycles is roughly five times that of fluctuations in GDP at conventional 
business cycle frequencies. Cycles in asset prices have higher amplitude still. Drehmann, 
Borio and Tsatsaronis (2011) report similar findings. This suggests that pro-cyclicality in 
the financial sector may be an important amplifier of the business cycle. 
The recent credit cycle has been particularly severe and synchronised internationally. In 
2006, private sector credit across the United Kingdom, United States and Euro-area rose by 
around 10 %. In some sectors, such as real estate, it was larger still. In the United Kingdom, 
SOURCE:  Aikman, Haldane and Nelson (2010).
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9  See also Borio and Lowe (2002), Mendoza and Terrones (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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the stock of credit extended to commercial real estate companies doubled between 2002 
and 2008; in Spain and Ireland, construction accounted for 20 per cent of the level of GDP 
in 2007. When the bubble burst, the flow of private credit collapsed. 
These credit booms and busts tend, historically, to have been amplified by four factors, all 
of which were present in the current crisis. First excessive leverage, especially in the 
banking system. When a credit boom is funded by banks operating at low levels of capital, 
the consequence is a heightened risk of subsequent banking sector distress when 
imbalances unravel. Leverage was a very important amplifier of both the recent credit 
boom and bust. A comparison with the late-1990s technology bubble is instructive here. 
The collapse of dotcom shares led to significant market volatility, but it was the wave of 
defaults on telecom debt that threatened banking stability.10
A second factor that intensifies credit booms and busts is maturity transformation. Funding 
long-term assets with short-term liabilities can be socially efficient and welfare-improving.11 
But taken to excess, this can expose banks to the risk of runs and the possibility that they 
might need to contract wholesale lending, hoard liquidity or sell assets at depressed market 
prices to meet actual or prospective withdrawals. Prior to the crisis, many banks reduced 
their holdings of liquid assets and became increasingly reliant on funding at shorter 
maturities. This amplified the credit cycle, with the growth of bank balance sheets highly 
correlated with the proportion of funding sourced from short-term wholesale deposits.12 
When the crisis hit, flighty sources of funding disappeared, putting further pressure on 
banks’ liquidity and solvency. 
A third factor is intra-financial system activity. Links between financial institutions can 
help manage risk and distribute funds to where they can be most efficiently deployed. But 
cyclicality in such interconnectedness can also fuel credit booms. For example, in the pre-
crisis period, securitisation was perceived to have dispersed risk around the system. But 
it reduced incentives for banks to screen and monitor lending, exacerbating over-
borrowing.13 It also lengthened the intermediation chain, masking a significant increase in 
leverage and maturity transformation across the system.14 
Fourth, the credit cycle can be amplified by a relaxation of the terms and conditions on 
transactions in financial markets. In the pre-crisis period, lending spreads fell for both the 
household and corporate sectors, while the share of new mortgages extended at high LTV 
and LTI ratios rose sharply.15 This contributed to the bubble in real estate lending in a 
number of countries, including the US, UK and Spain. Terms in wholesale borrowing 
markets also became progressively more lax, as did margining requirements on secured 
financing and derivatives transactions. The reversal of these trends was a major contributory 
factor to the collapse in interbank markets and the credit crunch.
The systemic consequences of shocks to asset prices and activity also depend importantly 
on structural features of the financial sector. These include the distribution or concentration 
2.2  CROSS SECTION OR 
STRUCTURAL RISKS
10  See Mishkin (2008).
11  See Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
12  Financial Services Authority (2009).
13  Consistent with this, Keys et al. (2010) observe that low documentation subprime mortgage loans with FICO 
scores just above 620 defaulted 20% more frequently than their counterparts with scores just below 620 – the 
former category were significantly easier to sell to investors via securitisations than the latter.  
14  See Hellwig (1995).
15  For example, in the United States typical LTV ratios rose prior to the crisis, with higher LTV ratios subsequently 
associated with higher default rates. 
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of risk across the financial system and the opacity (lack of information) and complexity 
(difficulty of assessing information) of financial products, institutions and the connections 
between them. All of these ingredients were important in the run-up to the crisis.
When risk is concentrated in a small number of institutions or markets, or when the provision 
of financial services is highly concentrated, the system is likely to be more vulnerable than if 
risks and the provision of services are more evenly distributed. As illustrated by the experiences 
of AIG and Lehman Brothers in the current crisis and Long-Term Capital Management and 
Credit Anstalt further back in history, distress or failure of a systemically important entity that 
is “too big to fail” can trigger spillovers to financial institutions or the wider economy which far 
exceed the contagion generated by the collapse of peripheral players.16 In other words, there 
are network externalities associated with the failure of key nodes in the financial system.
These externalities arise because individual institutions or infrastructure providers typically fail 
to take sufficient account of the effects of their own actions, or failure, on others within the 
system. This leads to under-insurance against systemic risk. Systemic significance may also 
give rise to expectations of state support, which further distort perceptions of risk by lowering 
the cost of funding that such institutions face.17 This supported rapid balance sheet expansion 
in the lead-up to the crisis. When such institutions subsequently failed during the crisis, they 
were provided state support to cushion their contagious consequences. In the UK, US and the 
Euro-area, state support of various types to financial institutions peaked at over 50 % of GDP.
Systemic risk can also be generated by the opacity and complexity of institutions, markets 
and financial instruments. These factors hinder the effective operation of market discipline to 
limit risk and potentially contribute to perception-driven contagion. Complexity also makes 
financial institutions more difficult to resolve. Pre-crisis, financial innovation spawned many 
examples of such complexity. For example, uncertainty over off-balance sheet exposures 
and banks’ widely differing valuations of the same complex structured products led investors 
to lose faith in published balance sheets and to reduce their appetite for complex financial 
products and institutions. 
Innovation linked to complex trading strategies may also contribute to market stress. For 
example, high-frequency trading strategies have been highlighted for their role in amplifying 
the 6 May 2010 US “flash crash”. There is evidence that such strategies can drive withdrawals 
of liquidity, amplifying stress. More generally, algorithmic trading strategies can lead to 
destabilising feedback loops, which in turn may lead to sharp price falls, possibly across a 
wide range of market venues. 
Given these different sources of systemic risk, a range of different types of macroprudential 
tools may be needed to tackle them.18 Prospective macroprudential tools can be roughly 
categorised three ways:19 
— Those that operate on financial institutions’ balance sheets;
— Those that affect the terms and conditions on financial transactions;
— Those that influence market structures.
3  Tools to tackle 
systemic risk
16  See Haldane (2009b), Gai et al. (2011) and Arinaminpathy et al. (2012).
17  Noss and Sowerbutts (2012) quantify the value of this implicit subsidy for UK banks.
18  See also Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) and Berntsson and Molin (2012).
19  See Bank of England (2011).
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The first two of these are primarily designed to tackle cyclical risks. The corresponding 
tools are likely to be time-varying in nature, ie tightened during periods of exuberance and 
relaxed when risks have receded or crystallised. The third category of tools is primarily 
geared towards cross-sectional risks and so would tend to be permanent, or at least 
durable, in nature. Table 2 lists some frequently discussed tools which fall into these 
various categories.20 
Balance sheet tools include maximum leverage ratios, countercyclical capital and liquidity 
ratios and dynamic provisioning frameworks. These tools influence the aggregate level of 
leverage and maturity mismatch in the financial system. As such, they might be used to 
contain generalised risks arising across the financial sector. For example, the counter-
cyclical capital buffer (CCB) under Basel III is intended to temper aggregate leverage over 
the credit cycle. Sectoral capital or liquidity requirements could, by contrast, have a role to 
play in targeting emerging risks in particular asset or liability classes. 
Some balance sheet tools may have a more structural dimension. For example, additional 
capital and/or liquidity requirements for systemically important institutions might be used 
to tackle cross-sectional risks, by lowering their probability of failure. Institutional reform, 
such as the structural separation or ring-fencing of investment and retail banking activities 
as proposed in the UK [by ICB (2011)], in the EU [by Liikanen (2012)] and in the US [by 
Volcker (2011)] operate instead by lowering the losses felt across the system in the event 
of failure, in part by enhancing the “resolvability” of large, complex banks.
Tools that influence the terms and conditions in financial transactions include the ability to 
restrict the quantity of, or the capital requirements on, lending at high LTVs. These 
macroprudential tools have been deployed by a number of emerging market countries 
over the past few years, including China, Hong Kong and Korea. Macroprudential policy 
could also operate on minimum margining requirements on secured financing or derivative 
Leverage Intra-?nancial system activity Maturity transformation
Balance-sheet tools
– Sectoral capital requirements
   targeted at real economy
   lending
– Dynamic provisioning 
– Stress testing
– Sectoral capital requirements
   targeted at intra-?nancial
   system activity
– Time-varying or sectoral
   liquidity buffers
Terms and conditions 
of transactions
– Loan-to-value, loan-to-income
   and debt-to-income
   restrictions
– Haircut / margin restrictions
– Remuneration practices – Use of central counterparties 
– Use of central
   counterparties 
– Design and use of trading
   venues (including ‘circuit
   breakers’)
– Disclosure requirements
SOURCE: Bank of England (2011).
Market structures
Key Ampli?cation 
Channels/ Tools
Time-varying risk Cross-sectional risk: 
distribution of risk; opacity; 
complexity
– Countercyclical capital buffers
– Maximum leverage ratios
– Limits on exposures to particular asset classes
– Capital/liquidity add-ons
   for systemically important
   ?nancial institutions
   (SIFIs)
– Large exposure /
   liability limits
– Institutional structure
   (e.g. ring-fencing)
– Time-varying liquidity buffers
   (e.g. Liquidity Coverage Ratios;
   Net Stable Funding Ratios;
   Core Funding Ratios;
   loan-to-deposit ratios)
– Sectoral liquidity buffers
– Limits on particular sources
   of funding or funding
   instruments
POTENTIAL MACROPRUDENTIAL INSTRUMENTS TABLE 2
20  See also CGFS (2010) and Bank of England (2011) for closely related analyses.
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transactions within the financial system – the wholesale market equivalent of minimum LTV 
ratios [CGFS (2009)]. 
The third category of macroprudential tools – market structure – includes a variety of 
interventions aimed at altering the topology of the financial network. For example, targeted 
disclosure requirements can be used to reduce uncertainty about specific exposures or 
interconnections, which may amplify cyclical or structural risks. The structure of remuneration 
practices could be used to influence risk-taking incentives by managers of financial firms. 
And the design and use of organised trading platforms and/or obligations to clear trades 
through central counterparties could bolster the resilience of markets that are central to the 
smooth functioning of the financial system. 
How might macroprudential policy be operated in practice? In this section, we consider the 
tasks involved in operationalising one particular macroprudential tool: the countercyclical 
buffer (CCB). 21 The CCB introduces a time-varying capital buffer over and above normal 
microprudential standards in relation to banks’ domestic exposures. It can be raised during 
periods of exuberance and subsequently reduced.22 The implementation of this tool 
requires: a) a risk assessment process; b) a procedure for reaching decisions, explaining 
those decisions to the public, coordinating with other relevant bodies – including systemic 
risk authorities in other countries – and enforcing decisions with firms; and c) an assessment 
of the possible impact of those decisions on financial stability and growth. In what follows, 
we describe progress in the UK towards developing a framework for carrying out each of 
these steps. The material in this section draws heavily on the analysis presented in Bank of 
England (2013). 
There are many different approaches for identifying threats to the financial system. Many 
authorities use indicator dashboards or cobwebs, including the European Systemic Risk 
Board, the Office of Financial Research in the United States, the World Bank, the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank.23 Stress testing aims to explore the resilience 
of the financial system under various adverse scenarios.24 Other modelling approaches 
include early-warning leading indicator models, composite indicators of systemic risk, and 
Merton-based models of systemic risk that use contingent claims analysis.25 
Given the complexity and state-contingency of signals from indicators and models, it 
would not make sense to tie movements in the CCB mechanically to any specific set of 
indicators or models. At the same time, the Bank of England’s new Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC) has identified a relatively short list of core financial and economic 
indicators that it will routinely review to help guide decisions to adjust the CCB. These 
are intended to help anchor policy actions, provide some consistency to decision-
making and give a basis for explaining actions to an external audience. They help 
enhance the predictability of the regime and reinforce the signalling channel of 
macroprudential policy.
4  Case study: 
operationalising 
countercyclical capital 
buffers in the UK
4.1  RISK ASSESSMENT AND 
INDICATORS TO GUIDE 
DECISION-MAKING
21  See Juks and Melander (2012) for a similar analysis for the case of Sweden.
22  The design features of the CCB are prescribed in some detail in Basel III and, in Europe, the forthcoming CRDIV/
CRR.  For further details on the specification of this tool in the United Kingdom, see Bank of England (2013).
23  For the US, see section 3 of the OFR Annual Report (2012). The ESRB’s Risk Dashboard’ is published on the web 
(see http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html). On the cobweb approach used in New Zealand and 
Norway, see Bedford and Bloor (2009) and Dahl et al. (2011), respectively. 
24  See Aikman et al. (2009), Burrows et al. (2012) and Kapadia et al. (2013) for a discussion of the Bank of England’s 
approach to stress testing and its “RAMSI” model.
25  On early warning indicator models, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Drehmann et al. (2011), Borio and Lowe 
(2002, 2004) and Barrell et al. (2010). On composite indicator models, see Illing and Liu (2006) and Holló et al. (2012). 
On contingent claims models, see Gray et al. (2008) and Gray and Jobst (2011).
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The full set of indicators is discussed in detail in Bank of England (2013); a brief overview 
is given below. Particular emphasis is placed on simple, high-level indicators rather than 
more complex metrics. As well as being important for transparency and accountability 
reasons, some empirical evidence and case studies suggest that simple indicators can 
often out-perform more complex alternatives in their predictive power due to their greater 
robustness in the face of uncertainty.26 
A natural starting point is the so-called “credit-to-GDP gap”, defined as the deviation of 
the ratio of household and corporate indebtedness to GDP from its long term trend. This 
is given particular prominence in Basel III. It has been found to be a useful leading indicator 
of past crises in many countries within sample.27 In the United Kingdom, it performed well 
in signalling emerging vulnerabilities in advance of each of the last three major episodes of 
financial distress (Chart 3). Prior to the current crisis, it would have suggested activating 
the CCB as early as 2002. It also would have suggested activating the CCB ahead of the 
UK secondary banking crisis in the 1970s and the small banks’ crisis in the early 1990s.28 
As discussed by Bank of England (2013, Box 2) and Giese et al. (2013), however, it is 
important to augment the information in the credit-to-GDP gap with a range of complementary 
indicators. This partly reflects its poorer ability to signal the possible need to reduce the 
CCB in the face of deteriorating credit conditions (Chart 3). The indicator also fails to 
account for the absolute level of credit and is agnostic on the sources or quality of credit.  
To meet these concerns, it is helpful to monitor a wider set of indicators reflecting bank and 
non-bank balance sheet stretch. Aggregate risk-based capital ratios and leverage ratios 
reflect the amount of capital that the financial sector has available to absorb losses on its 
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26  See Haldane and Madouros (2012) and Aikman et al. (2013).
27  See Borio and Lowe (2002), Alessi and Detken (2009) and Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2011).  Barrell and 
Karim (2012), however, find little evidence that the indicator signals crises in OECD countries, although they find 
some role in emerging market economies. Repullo and Saurina (2012) also criticise this indicator on the grounds 
of its negative correlation with GDP growth in many countries.
28  See Giese et al. (2013). 
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assets, on a risk-weighted and unweighted basis respectively. A rapid build-up in leverage 
(i.e. a fall in leverage ratios) in the major UK banks was an important driver of the current 
financial crisis (Chart 4). Risk-based capital ratios tended to provide poorer signals before 
this crisis, particularly for larger banks29 ; their failure to signal impending problems reflected 
a secular decline in average risk weights. Some studies from earlier episodes, however, 
have tended to find a more positive role for risk-based standards in predicting bank failure.30 
Going forward, there is likely to be value in monitoring both metrics in determining whether 
banks have sufficient buffers to absorb future losses during periods of stress. And since 
profits are the first line of defence against losses, simple measures of the core profitability 
of the banking system, such as the pre-tax return on assets, are also likely to be useful in 
such circumstances. 
Another helpful indicator of banks’ balance sheet stretch is the loan-to-deposit ratio, 
which provides a signal of whether the provision of credit has become too reliant on 
unstable funding sources. Rising loan-to-deposit ratios were evident in many countries 
prior to this crisis. This indicator also performed well in signalling impending distress in 
East Asia in 1997-98 (Chart 5). 
Market-based metrics can provide corroborative evidence on perceptions of banking sector 
health. Spreads on bank debt, such as subordinated debt spreads and CDS on senior 
unsecured debt, indicate financial market participants’ assessment of the likelihood of 
bank failure. The views of equity market investors, meanwhile, can be gauged by considering 
banks’ price to book ratios and market-based leverage ratios. But these indicators need 
to be interpreted with caution. In periods of exuberance, they may be subject to significant 
mispricing or indeed even a “volatility paradox”: times of low volatility may be associated 
with a build up of leverage, which increases systemic risk. 
29  Haldane and Madouros (2012).
30  See Avery and Berger (1991 and Estrella, Park and Peristiani (2000).
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October 2012.   
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Moving beyond banks, movements in national balance sheet indicators such as the current 
account provide a natural indicator of balance sheet stretch in the wider economy. Large 
and persistent current account deficits and high and rising external indebtedness have 
tended to precede past crises. For example, these factors were observed prior to the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s, the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, and the more recent 
crises in the United States and some euro area economies. 
These balance sheet metrics can be complemented by monitoring indicators of terms and 
conditions in financial markets. For example, conditions in global capital markets can be 
indicative of overall levels of risk appetite, as reflected in metrics relating to equity markets 
(such as the VIX which captures expectations of stock market volatility) and debt markets 
(such as global spreads over risk-free rates, for example on corporate bonds or on 
collateralised and securitised debt). Signals of strong risk appetite, combined with low or 
falling long term real interest rates, may indicate a “search for yield”.
The UK’s FPC meets quarterly to assess the information in the core indicators, alongside 
a wider set of information including from stress testing and other models, and from market 
and supervisory intelligence. Having reached a decision on whether to alter the CCB, the 
rationale for the FPC’s decisions is communicated externally through some combination 
of a press release, a Record of the meeting (published approximately two weeks afterwards) 
and the Bank of England’s twice-yearly Financial Stability Report.
For the CCB, international coordination is ensured by the reciprocity arrangements 
enshrined in Basel III. In particular, overseas regulators are expected to apply the CCB 
rate chosen by the FPC for their banks’ UK exposures and vice versa. This should help 
to enhance the effectiveness of macroprudential policy by reducing the likelihood of 
international leakages. Such leakages are likely to be substantial if policies are 
uncoordinated – for example, Aiyar et al. (2012) find that one third of the impact of higher 
Pillar 2 capital requirements on UK banks may be offset by increased lending by foreign 
branches.
4.2  DECISION-MAKING, 
COORDINATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION
SOURCES: World Bank, published accounts and Bank calculations.
a The years beside the country names give the dates of the ?rst year of a banking crisis, based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
b The UK measure is major UK banks' customer lending as a percentage of customer funding, where customer refers to all non-bank borrowers and depositors. 
Where disclosed, repurchase agreements are excluded from loans and deposits. The measure for all other countries is the 'Bank credit to bank deposits' series 
from the World Bank Global Financial Development database. In their measure of credit, the World Bank include the ?nancial resources provided to the private 
sector by domestic money banks.  
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For other macroprudential actions, it will also be important to consider possible cross-
country spillovers when reaching macroprudential decisions. The forthcoming Capital 
Requirements Directive and Regulation will institutionalise a coordination process within 
the EU to assess such spillovers, including the potentially negative spillovers from failing 
to act in a timely fashion to mitigate domestic systemic risks – it is important to balance 
policy coordination with a need to avoid inaction bias. 
Once policy action on the CCB has been agreed, banks will typically have twelve months to 
meet any increase in the CCB – although a shorter implementation period may be 
recommended to the regulators in exceptional circumstances. Banks that fail to meet the 
buffer level in the required time, or breach it subsequently, will be subject to automatic 
restrictions on dividends and discretionary bonuses and will be required to prepare a plan 
explaining how they will meet the buffer level within an appropriate timeframe.31 It will be the 
responsibility of the microprudential authority to monitor compliance and to impose further 
supervisory measures if needed. A decision to decrease the CCB can take effect immediately. 
The objectives of the FPC in setting the CCB are to ensure resilience of the UK financial 
system and, subject to that, to support the government’s objectives for employment and 
output. To understand whether policy actions are consistent with these objectives requires 
a view on how CCB decisions are likely to affect financial stability and growth. The key 
links in the transmission mechanism are illustrated in Figure 1. 
A decision to apply the CCB when threats to resilience are increasing will enhance financial 
stability in two ways. First, capital provides a cushion to absorb losses. So, holding fixed 
4.3  IMPACT ANALYSIS
SOURCE: Bank of England (2013).
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31  Under the forthcoming CRD4/CRR, banks whose capital ratio falls within the upper quartile of the combined 
conservation buffer and CCB will be required to retain 40% of their profits.  Banks then face a sliding scale of 
restrictions, whereby as a bank’s capital ratio falls further from the target, it is required to conserve capital by 
paying out smaller dividends and bonuses to shareholders and employees. Specifically, these distribution 
restrictions increase to 60%, 80% and 100% as banks’ capital ratios fall to the third, second and first quartiles 
respectively.
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banks’ asset and liability positions, a change in the CCB will have the direct effect of 
increasing the loss absorbing capacity of the banking system, reducing the likelihood and 
severity of financial crises. This effect is shown in Figure 1 by the central arrows linking 
capital ratios to resilience and medium-to-long term GDP. While the precise magnitude of 
this channel is uncertain, there are strong a priori grounds for expecting the sign to be 
positive – greater capital reduces the likelihood of crisis.32 
Second, the CCB will also affect financial stability through its impact on credit conditions. 
This size of this channel will depend on various factors including the sensitivity of risk 
premia on bank debt and equity to banks’ leverage,33 the ease with which banks are able 
to raise fresh equity in capital markets or adjust retained earnings, the stickiness of loan 
interest rates and the degree of competition in the banking sector. 
For example, if capital buffers are increased in the midst of a credit boom, then the tighter 
credit conditions that follow may boost financial stability by helping to arrest the build-up 
of vulnerabilities created by the over-extension of credit. Similarly, if previously accumulated 
capital buffers are reduced in the midst of a contraction, then that may help to loosen 
credit conditions, so boosting the economy and thereby helping to reduce borrower 
defaults. This channel is shown by the arrow in Figure 1, linking credit conditions to short-
term GDP growth. Of course, the strength of these effects may vary depending on whether 
policy is being tightened or loosened – we come on to discuss such asymmetries in the 
transmission mechanism in Section 5.1.
The effect of these tools on risk-taking behaviour is likely to be more powerful if financial 
markets anticipate that the policy change will be reinforced by further policy changes in 
these measures. As in other areas of public policy, there could be an important role for 
expectations in shaping this collective behaviour. This “signalling channel” of macroprudential 
policy is depicted in Figure 1 by the arrows running from capital ratios through to credit 
conditions, via the box marked “expectations”, and then on to resilience.
There are as yet no published estimates of the likely impact of changes in the CCB on 
credit conditions. But some recent studies have analysed the quantitative impact of an 
increase in capital requirements on banks’ lending behaviour (Table 3). While the results 
differ according to the methodologies employed, and whether permanent or temporary 
shocks are being analysed, most find that an increase in regulatory capital requirements 
generates only a modest tightening in credit conditions. For example, based on existing 
studies, a 1 percentage point increase in capital requirements is estimated to lead to an 
increase in the interest rate on bank loans of between 4.5 and 25 basis points and a 
decline in the quantity of lending of between 0 % and 3.6 % relative to baseline. These 
effects also operate with long and variable lags, often of a couple of years.
A study by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
used a similar methodology to estimate the impact of a change in capital requirements on 
32  A deeper justification for capital to enhance banks’ survival probability is provided by incentive-based theories 
like Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), where capital strengthens banks’ incentives to monitor borrowers.  Gale (2010) 
sounds a note of caution however in his review of the theoretical literature on bank capital and risk taking: 
general equilibrium effects in these models can sometimes lead to the relationship flipping sign. 
33  This is the Modigliani-Miller effect. Banks’ cost of equity tends to exceed the rate at which they can borrow. 
This reflects the preferential treatment of debt in the tax system, market perceptions that the debt-holders of 
large banks are unlikely to suffer losses because such banks will not be allowed to fail (the so-called “too-big-
to-fail” problem), and greater uncertainty over the future earnings that will accrue to shareholders compared to 
debt-holders who have more certainty over interest payments. These frictions may also make the cost of debt 
insensitive to banks” leverage and hence their solvency risk.
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economic growth.34 It estimated that GDP will contract by between 0.05 % and 0.35 % relative 
to baseline in the short run following a 100 basis point increase in headline capital requirements. 
The largest average impact on GDP across these models was around -0.2 % relative to 
baseline, occurring after around ten quarters (Chart 6). 
These are the best quantitative estimates currently available to guide the setting of the CCB. 
But the uncertainty is sufficiently large that they need to be treated with caution. One reason 
for this is that the results in both Table 3 and Chart 6 pertain to a change in headline capital 
requirements, whereas the CCB will apply only to banks’ domestic exposures. Also, some of 
the studies assume a permanent increase in capital requirements rather than a cyclical regime. 
SOURCE: Bank of England (2013).
a The Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG) analysed the impact of the transition to Basel III across a range of alternative models, calibrated across a wide 
????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????????? ???
?????????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????????? ??????????
b? ???????????????????? ????????????????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????? ???????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
c? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
d? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ratios. Monetary policy is held constant.
Loan rates
(basis points)
Loan volumes 
(per cent)
?ermanent change in re?uired capital
    MAG (2010) (a) ??.3 [5.1, 25.0]  ?1.? [?0.?, ?3.6]
    Elliot (2009) (b) [?.5, 19.0] —
Temporary change in re?uired capital 
    Aiyar et al. (2012) c) — [?6.8, ?9.0]
    Francis and Osborne (2012) (d) — 0.0
ILLUSTRATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF A 100 BASIS POINT INCREASE IN BANKS  HEADLINE CAPITAL TABLE 3
34  See Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010).
SOURCE: Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010).
 
a The shaded areas indicate the 20-80th percentile and 40-60th percentile ranges respectively. The yellow line shows the unweighted median. The distribution of 
outcomes is computed across 89 models, discussed in MAG (2010). The results do not include the impact of international spillovers.  
b The vertical line indicates the 18th quarter.
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More fundamentally, all such estimates reflect average relationships between banks’ 
capital ratios and credit conditions in the past. It is well known that past relationships can 
be a poor guide to the future, particularly when there are large structural changes in the 
economy. The creation of a macroprudential regime might be one such structural change. 
For example, if financial markets come to expect the CCB to be raised in a sequence of 
steps when exuberant lending threatens financial stability, then the initial impact of policy 
actions might be larger than past relationships would suggest. 
The relationship between capital requirements and credit conditions is also likely to vary in 
important ways depending on economic circumstances. For example, in a situation of 
acute uncertainty about banks’ solvency, their borrowing costs may be highly sensitive to 
their capital adequacy (Chart 7). In these circumstances, a decision to increase capital 
adequacy may improve confidence to such an extent that overall funding costs fall. That, 
in turn, might be expected to relax credit conditions. The recapitalisation of UK banks in 
2008 and the US stress tests and consequent capital raising of 2009 may have had 
precisely such an effect.
While considerable progress has been made in making macroprudential regimes 
operational over the past few years, a large number of practical challenges remain. From 
a potentially long list, we discuss three such open issues: how to improve macroprudential 
policy effectiveness in a downturn; how to make macroprudential decisions when there is 
uncertainty about the impact of decisions and magnitude of threats; and how to foster 
policy coordination between macroprudential, microprudential and monetary policies. 
Macroprudential regimes will be at their most effective when policies are set in a broadly 
symmetric fashion. In practice, that means tightening macroprudential policy tools when 
lending practices are exuberant but, just as importantly, loosening those tools either when 
risks recede or when credit conditions need a boost. Achieving this balance will be a major 
policy challenge. 
It is often felt that, in situations of stress, many of the arms of macroeconomic policy are 
constrained – that policy risks “pushing on a string”. Macroprudential policy is no 
exception. For example, the market might demand higher (than regulatory) capital 
5 Open issues
5.1  MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY IN A DOWNTURN
SOURCES: Capital IQ, Markit Group Limited, published accounts, Bank of England and Bank calculations.
a Market-based capital ratios are banks' market capitalisation as a percentage of published risk-weighted assets.
b The sample shown is the largest 20 European banks by assets.
c ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
d Where possible, Capital IQ data has been used to calculate the market-based capital ratio, but for some banks it was necessary to use published accounts data.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET-BASED CAPITAL RATIOS AND FUNDING COST IN NOVEMBER 2012 (a) (b) (c) (d) CHART 7
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
350 
0 5 10 15 20 25 
EUROPEAN BANKS UK BANKS 
  
CDS premia (basis points) 
 Market -based capital ratio (Per cent) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
requirements in a downswing because they fear the risk of insolvency. That would 
potentially reduce the potency of a macroprudential loosening of policy, for example in 
stimulating credit and growth.
But recent empirical research by Jiménez et al. (2012) has reached a more optimistic 
conclusion on the effects of macroprudential policy loosening. The authors analyse the 
economic impact of the Bank of Spain’s dynamic provisioning framework – a close cousin 
of the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer. In particular, they ask whether its impact 
differed in good times (when buffers were being built up) from the downswing (when the 
buffers were being released). 
In the upswing, they find that the banks that had to provision more cut their credit supply 
by most, as might be expected. But, crucially, this macroprudential policy tightening had 
relatively little effect on overall credit conditions or the macroeconomy. The reason was 
that other lenders stepped in and picked up the slack created by constrained banks 
exiting. In other words, credit was highly substitutable during the boom.
By contrast, the release of buffers in 2008 Q4 was found to have had a large positive 
incremental effect on lending, employment and firm survival in 2009 and 2010, albeit 
relative to a baseline in which credit conditions were tightening substantially. The reason is 
that, in a bust, credit supply is not very substitutable, with fewer alternative suppliers of 
credit to households and customers. So, while the overall level of provisioning turned out 
to be too small to save Spain from a severe macroeconomic downturn, these results do 
suggest that macroprudential policy could in fact be more potent in a downswing, not less. 
The design of macroprudential tools can also help to foster a symmetric regime. For 
instance, it may make sense to distinguish between stocks and flows of lending in the 
application of such tools. Capital requirements are traditionally applied uniformly to both 
the stock of banks’ existing assets and to any new loans created. But suppose capital 
requirements on new loans could be flexed without affecting those applied to the back-
book of existing assets. Such an approach could be particularly useful in the downswing 
as it could stimulate credit supply while reducing the risks associated with release of the 
buffers. Banks would only benefit from capital relief to the extent they continued to lend, 
thus stimulating credit supply; while their resilience against legacy assets would still be 
protected. In the UK, such an approach has recently been put into practice with a lower 
effective capital charge placed on new loans relative to old to stimulate credit supply.35
Another major challenge in designing macroprudential policies is how to deal with high 
degrees of (Knightian) uncertainty. This can take many forms: uncertainty over the severity 
of the threats to financial stability and how these have changed; uncertainty about the 
structure of the economy and the financial system; uncertainty about the impact of 
alternative policy tools; and uncertainty about the impact of policy actions on market 
participants’ expectations. 
While there is no clear guide from the academic literature on what optimal policy should be in 
such an environment,36 some general policy design lessons can be drawn. For example, it is 
clear that policymakers should not worsen this uncertainty problem through their own actions 
5.2  MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY
35  For details, see http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/other/adjustments-capital-planning-buffers.pdf.
36  See Brainard (1969) and Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2004).  
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and reactions. Among other things, this calls for as clear and transparent a macroprudential 
decision-making process as possible.
There are several potential dimensions to such a transparent regime. One is having as 
clear as possible a set of inputs to the policy decision-making process. As discussed in 
Section 4, the Bank of England’s FPC has recently published a list of the core indicators it 
intends using to set macroprudential policy, for just this reason. The credit-to-GDP ratio 
guideline path specified as part of Basel III is also intended to serve an indicator role.
A more sophisticated step would be to produce, and potentially publish, information on 
stress-tests for key macroprudential measures such as liquidity, capital, lending and 
output. For example, in the United States an annual round of such top-down stress-testing 
has been in place since 2009, with a high degree of transparency about both inputs and 
outputs. This is generally felt to have reduced market participants’ uncertainty about the 
true state of health of US banks’ balance sheets and thereby supported financial stability.
A third layer of transparency concerns the deliberations of the macroprudential policy 
committee itself. In the UK, a Record of the meeting of the FPC is published, broadly in line 
with the practices of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. This is intended to make 
transparent the nature of the FPC’s discussion and the reasoning behind its policy stance. 
Over time, this will help external participants understand the shape and nature of the 
FPC’s “reaction function”. Inevitably, this will be a two-way process, as the FPC learn more 
about how its actions affect the macro-financial environment and market participants learn 
more about how the FPC intends operating its tools. 
One key policy lesson, which is well-illustrated in a wide range of other policy environments, 
is the need to avoid fine-tuning macroprudential responses when uncertainty is great and 
past historical evidence limited. Simplicity, both in approach and in action, can be of 
considerable value in such uncertain environments in avoiding the large errors that 
otherwise might arise if policy is over-fitted, over-complicated or hyper-active.37  
A third challenge relates to the co-ordination of macroprudential policies with other policy 
levers, in particular micro-prudential and monetary policies. In general, these three arms of 
policy would be expected to be complementary and mutually-supportive. For example, 
during the pre-crisis credit boom, a macroprudential policy tightening would have helped 
alleviate strains on micro-prudential regulation of individual firms. It would also potentially 
have helped reduce the costs of the crisis, thereby alleviating some of the burden 
subsequently placed on monetary policy.
Nonetheless, because these three arms of policy are, at least to some extent, overlapping 
in their impact, they do raise new and important issues of co-ordination. Attaching all three 
arms of policy to a single body – in the UK, the Bank of England – can help in this co-
ordination process, as it internalises any policy spillovers, or externalities, which might 
otherwise arise between them.
Nonetheless, this framework still requires that the three decision-makers consider the 
impact of each others’ actions when making their own policy decisions.38 For example, 
monetary policy forecasts for inflation and output will need to include an assumption about 
5.3  MACROPRUDENTIAL 
POLICY CO-ORDINATION
37  Haldane and Madouros (2012); Aikman et al. (2013).
38  For a recent discussion, see Stein (2013).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 24
the stance of macroprudential policy. And macroprudential stress-testing will in turn need 
to make assumptions about the course of monetary policy and the macro-economy. 
Co-ordination issues also arise when co-ordinating macroprudential and microprudential 
policies. By and large, macroprudential tools involve using microprudential tools to address 
risks to the stability of the financial system as a whole. At some points in the cycle, there 
may be tensions between the instrument settings appropriate for macro and microprudential 
purposes. These problems are perhaps most acute during the downswing, when a 
macroprudential release of buffers could sit awkwardly with a microprudential approach of 
seeking to bolster firms’ resilience. 
Potential trade-offs and tensions between policy settings are part and parcel of public policy. 
The benefits of having a clearly defined policy framework, including for macroprudential 
policy, is that these trade-offs can be discussed and, ideally, resolved openly. Having distinct 
policy committees, with distinct statutory remits, ought to make that policy process of 
openness and resolution no more difficult, and potentially somewhat easier. It certainly ought 
to make it more transparent and understandable to the wider world.
There is an urgent need for more research on all of these important macroprudential 
questions – and more besides. If macroprudential policy reduces somewhat the chances 
or severity of another systemic crisis, the gains to society are potentially enormous.
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